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municipal court to the appellate department of the superior 
court during that period. It is apparent that the subpoena 
as served was too broad in some of its demands and that 
compliance would have put an unnecessary burden on de-
fendant. It should have been restricted to data which would 
be relevant as having some substantial similarity to the case 
at bar. The ruling of the trial court quashing this subpoena 
does not, therefore, furnish a ground for reversal of the judg-
ment, and the question in its present application need not 
occur on the new trial. 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is reversed and 
the cause remanded for a new trial on the issue which re-
mains open. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., Carter, ,J., Traynor, ,J., and Mc-
Comb, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
My views are in accord with those expressed in the opinion 
of the District Court of Appeal written by Mr. Justice Ash-
burn. (Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Co., (Cal.App.) 302 
P.2d 877.) I would therefore modify and affirm the judgment. 
[Crim. No. 5992. In Bank. May 10, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM GERALD 
MOORE, JR., Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law- Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photo-
graphs.-While evidence of colored slides picturing the vic-
tim's body in a first degree murder case should be faithful 
and accurate, it was within the discretion of the trial court to 
admit such pictures, particularly where the jury heard the 
photographer's testimony that one transparency had a red or 
orange effect from the light and type of film used, that the 
objects pictured were accurately reproduced, and that the 
color of the body and wounds was not distorted. 
[2] !d.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photographs.-It was 
not error to admit in evidence colored slides picturing the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 226 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law,§ 524; [3] Homicide, 
§58; [4] Criminal Law, § 393(1); [5] Criminal Law, § 585; [6] 
Homicide, § 145(2). 
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victim's body, in a first degree murder case, though a surgeon 
testified that the victim died of internal injuries, where these 
were caused by external blows, the nature of which appeared 
from the slides, and where the pictures were such as would 
aid the jury in determining the circumstances surrounding the 
victim's death. 
[3] Homicide-Evidence-State of Mind of Defendant-Intent.-
In a prosecution for murder of a woman following a taxicab 
ride, it was not prejudicial error to admit evidence concerning 
defendant's earlier taxicab ride with another woman where 
this evidence was relevant on the question of his intent and 
purpose in picking up strange women, including the victim, 
and showed that, within a relatively short time before the 
victim was killed, defendant had been twice frustrated in 
his desire and purpose to engage in sexual intercourse. 
[ 4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Offenses.-Evidence which 
tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to 
establish any fact material for the People, or to overcome 
any material matter sought to be proved by the defense, is 
admissible whether or not it embraces the commission of 
another crime, whether or not the other crime be similar in 
kind, and whether or not it be part of a single design. 
[5] Id.-Evidence~Circumstantial Evidence.-Circumstantial evi-
dence is as sufficient to convict as direct evidence. 
[6] Homicide-Evidence.-Evidence in a homicide case showing 
defendant's desire and purpose to have sexual intercourse 
with the woman killed, her refusal to go to a van for that 
purpose, the nature of the injuries to her body when found 
near the van, and the fact that her clothing had been torn 
off sustained an implied finding that defendant had killed 
her in the course of an attempted rape, which killing, under 
the felony murder doctrine (Pen. Code, § 189), constituted 
first degree murder. 
APPEAr_. (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
f>Ubd. (b)) from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Bernardino County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Carl B. Hilliard, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 28 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§ 323 et seq. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 310 et seq. 
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,John C. McCarthy and Theo. G. Krumm, under appoint~ 
ment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, Raymond lVL Momboisse, Deputy 
Attorney General, Lowell E. Lathrop, District Attorney (San 
Bernardino), and J. Steve Williams, Deputy District Attorney, 
for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty 
by reason of insanity to the charge of murdering one Hulda 
Hoag. 'rhe jury found him guilty of murder in the first de-
gree and fixed the penalty at death. Defendant withdrew his 
insanity plea and, after his motion for new trial had been 
denied, the death penalty was imposed. 'l'he appeal is auto-
matic under section 1239, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code. 
Mrs. Hoag was killed at some time between 8 and 11 o'clock 
on the evening of March 16, 1956. In the afternoon of that 
day defendant, a 33-year-old carnival worker, left a bar in 
San Bernardino with a woman (not Mrs. Hoag), and the 
couple entered a taxicab. They discussed whether they should 
go to a motel or the woman's house, and she gave the driver 
her address. Defendant argued with the woman when she 
said he could not enter her home, and he refused to pay the 
fare since there was "nothing in it" for him. He left the 
taxicab and was finally given a ride back to the downtown area 
by policemen who had investigated the incident. 
Defendant entered another tavern about 5o 'clock that after-
noon, had several beers, and struck up a conversation with 
Mrs. Hoag, who was 62 years old. Their friendship apparently 
ripened quickly, and he invited her to come and live with 
him. By 7 :30, hugging and kissing had led to more intimate 
advances. Because of this and because Mrs. Hoag had be-
come ill, the bartender asked the couple to leave and called 
a taxicab for them. 
The driver of this vehicle testified that defendant instructed 
him to drive to the location of the carnival trailers at the 
National Orange Show. During the trip, which lasted about 
half an hour, defendant continued "making love to" Mrs. 
Hoag. At about 8 o'clock the driver left the couple near a 
field where the trailers were parked and saw them cross a 
cable and enter the field. Both had obviously been drinking 
and Mrs. Hoag, who was staggering, was assisted by defendant. 
Defendant testified that he and Mrs. Hoag then sat on the 
running board of a truck and drank from a bottle which he had 
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with him; that they ''started playing aronnd a little like we 
did in that bar"; and that the~' "got into a little argument!' 
He told her that the,\' ''had to sleep in the van,'' as he ''didn't 
make the kind of money to sleep in a hotel." Mrs. Hoag rr-
fused to ,;leep in the vau, and he told hPr ''You are just as 
bad as the other woman that was in the taxicab after me pre-
vious to that.'' 
A carnival worker who was sleeping in one of the vans 
heard a woman's voice say "Don't do this," or "Oh, don't do 
this to me.'' He also heard a sound of scraping which seemed 
to come from the vicinity of an adjoining van. He did not 
believe that the voice he heard showed distress, and he did 
not disturb himself. 
Shortly before 11 that evening another carnival worker dis-
covered Mrs. Hoag's nude body in a field near the trailers 
and summoned officers. The body was cold, with only slight 
warmth between the head and shoulders where they were 
pressed together. There was no pulse. Her clothing and 
personal effects were scattered over and near the trailers. A 
pass to a roller derby was also discovered in the vicinity. 
Mrs. Hoag had been severely beaten. Her breastbone and 
eight ribs had been fractured. The body was scratched and 
bruised but she had died, according to the autopsy surgeon, 
from shock and hemorrhages from internal injuries. These 
injmies were caused by blows which could have been admin-
istered by a fist, knee, or shod foot. There was no testimony 
showing that Mrs. Hoag had been actually raped, but the 
surgeon did testify that there were contusions on the outer 
section of the sex organs and bruises and scratches on the 
front surface of the thighs. 
Black and white photographs and colored slides, showing 
the body as it was found and also showing the general area, 
were admitted in evidence. 'rhey were used by the surgeon 
and other witnesses while explaining the victim's injuries 
and the scene of the crime. 
Footprints were found near the trailers. A footprint ex-
pert testified that defendant was wearing shoes that could 
have made the prints. Defendant was questioned and there-
after arrested. Pictures of footprints made by defendant after 
his arrest were compared with footprints found at the scene. 
The prints were similar. 
A criminologist testified that while there were several spots 
of human blood on the trousers which defendant wore on 
March 16, their areas were too small to identify the type of 
the blood. No seminal spots were found on defendant's cloth-
May 1957] PEoPLE v. MooRE 
[48 C.2d 541; 310 P.2d 969] 
545 
ing nor were any identifiable fingerprints discovered on the 
items found at the scene of the killing. There were two small 
tears on defendant's trousers, near the hip pockets. These 
could have been made if defendant had backed into a barbed 
wire fence near the trailers while dragging the body to the 
place where it was found. 
Defendant sought to quit his job the morning after the 
killing but was told that he could not leave until the carnival 
closed. His employer testified that defendant did not tell him 
why he wanted to quit. The employer admitted that he had 
previously spoken to defendant's former employers who may 
have stated that they would have liked to have defendant 
work for them again. 
Defendant told a deputy sheriff, and again stated on cross-
examination, that he had served a sentence in Iowa for rape. 
The sheriff testified that he asked defendant after his ar-
rest why he had killed Mrs. Hoag and defendant replied, "I 
don't know why I did it," that he did not want to hurt anyone 
and that "I don't remember. I blacked out. I can't remem-
ber anything.'' The sheriff also testified that defendant later 
sought to plead guilty to second degree murder and stated 
that he remembered more than he had told the officers but if 
he told them more he ''would burn for sure.'' 
Defendant testified that he had been drinking beer and 
whiskey all afternoon on March 16, that he met Mrs. Hoag at 
the bar and gave her a roller derby pass, and that he brought 
her to the carnival trailers near the fair grounds. He decided, 
he said, that they had drunk too much to visit the fair itself 
or to have intercourse; and when she objected to sleeping in 
one of the carnival vans, they argued and he left her. He 
stated that he then went to a tavern in Colton with a fellow 
employee for more drinks, returned to the carnival, went to 
sleep in the cab of a truck at the carnival, and awoke the next 
morning on a carrousel. 
Defendant also testified that his employer knew he wished 
to quit because his former employers had offered him a better 
job. He stated that he told the sheriff. "I didn't do it. If I 
did, I didn't know I did.'' He also testified that the sheriff 
had tried to convince him that he should plead guilty to second 
degree murder but he refused. 
On cross-examination defendant admitted that he had lied 
during preliminary questioning by sheriff's deputies when 
he told them that he had returned to the fair grounds during 
the afternoon of March 16. 
48 C.2d-18 
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Defendant's only other witness >vas a woman who also 
worked at the earnival. Shf' <~orrohorated one phase of his 
testimony by stating that she was with defendant when be 
tore his trousers while repairing the carnival equipment. 
[1] Defendant eontends that ttw trial court eommitted 
prejudicial error in admitting in evidence the three colored 
slides picturing the victim's body. While the photographer 
testified that one transparency had a red or orange effect from 
the light and the type of film used, he also stated that the 
objects pictured were accurately reproduced and that the 
color of the body and wounds was not distorted. \Vhile such 
evidence should be faithful and accurate (People v. Goodwin, 
9 Cal.2d 711, 714 [72 P.2d 551] ), it was within the discretion 
of the trial court to admit the pictures, particularly when the 
jury had heard the testimony as to the color and its causes. 
(See People v. Burwell, 44 Cal.2d 16, 34 [279 P.2d 744].) 
[2] Defendant also argues that the transparencies were ir-
relevant since the surgeon testified that Mrs. Hoag died of 
internal injuries. These were caused, however, by the external 
blows, the nature of which appeared from the transparencies. 
The introduction of photographs showing the body of the 
victim has been disapproved "where no useful purpose is 
served thereby" (People v. Sisson, 1 Cal.2d 510, 511 [36 P.2d 
116]), but the pictures here were such as would aid the jury 
in determining the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Hoag's 
death. (See People v. Osborn, 37 Cal.2d 380, 383 [231 P.2d 
850]; People v. Dunn, 29 Cal.2d 654, 659 [177 P.2d 553].) 
[3] Defendant next contends that it was prejudicial error 
to admit the evidence concerning his afternoon taxicab ride 
with another woman. However, this evidence of defendant's 
earlier activities was relevant on the question of his intent 
and purpose in picking up strange women, including Mrs. 
Hoag. Thus the evidence showed that, within a relatively 
short time before Mrs. Hoag was killed, defendant had been 
twice frustrated in his obvious desire and purpose to engage in 
sexual intercourse. It could therefore be reasonably inferred 
from all the evidence that defendant had been aroused to 
the point of using force and that he did use force in attempt-
ing to accomplish his purpose with Mrs. Hoag. 
[ 4] "The general teRts of the admissibility of evidence in 
a criminal case are: ... does it tend logically, naturally, and 
by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material for the 
people, or to overcome any material matter sought to be 
proved by the defense~ If it does, then it is admissible, 
whether it embraces the commission of another crime or does 
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not, whether the other crime be similar in kind or not, whether 
it be part of a single design or not." (People v. Sanders, 114 
Cal. 216, 230 [ 46 P. 153) ; see also People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 
306, 315 [169 P.2d 924), and cases cited.) 
Defendant's final contention is that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support his conviction. [5] It is true that the evi-
dence is largely circumstantial, but such evidence ''is as 
sufficient to convict as direct evidence." (People v. Reed, 38 
Cal.2d 423, 431 [240 P.2d 590).) 
[6] Defendant argues that even if there is sufficient evi-
dence to sustain his conviction of murder, the circumstances 
surrounding the murder are undisclosed, and therefore the 
verdict should be murder of the second degree. (People v. 
Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385].) 
Here, however, the testimony, including that showing defend-
ant's obvious desire and purpose to have sexual intercourse 
with Mrs. Hoag, her refusal to go to the van for that purpose, 
the nature of the injuries to her body when found near the 
van, and the fact that her clothing had been torn off, was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the implied finding that defend-
ant had killed her in the course of an attempted rape. (People 
v. Lewis, 220 Cal. 510 [31 P.2d 357] ; People v. Wheelock, 
6 Cal.Unrep. 914 [68 P. 579].) Such a killing, under the 
felony murder doctrine (Pen. Code, § 189), constitutes first 
degree murder. 
Defendant makes no complaint concerning the instruc-
tions. The jury was properly instructed on the elements of 
rape, attempted rape, and the felony murder doctrine. There 
was ample evidence to sustain the verdict of first degree mur-
der under that doctrine. 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,T., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, ,T.-I dissent. 
I do not agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the 
judgment of conviction of first degree murder; I also am of 
the opinion that the evidence concerning defendant's conduct 
earlier in the day of the crime could have had no other object, 
or effect, than to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the 
JUry. 
Even the People do "not stress the argument" that defend-
ant was guilty of premeditated, deliberate and wilful murder, 
but argue that this was a killing committed in the attempt to 
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commit, or the actual perpetration of, rape. There is abso-
lutely no evidence whatsoever in the record to support this 
latter theory: The victim willingly engaged in making love, 
and permitting the defendant to make love to her; she went 
with him voluntarily with the expressed purpose of having 
sexual intercourse with him-not only that night, but in the 
future since she intended to live with him and tentative 
arrangements were made for another patron of the bar to take 
her and the defendant to her home and pick up her belongings 
the following Sunday morning. 
The testimony concerning the defendant's and victim's 
supposed presence at the trailer when the victim was over-
heard to say "Don't do this" or "Oh, don't do this to me" 
was expressly stated by the witness to be that the woman did 
not seem to be in any distress and "wasn't screaming, any-
thing like that." The witness testified that he didn't hear a 
man's voice; that for a few seconds he heard something like 
scraping against tin. Defendant testified that when the victim 
refused to sleep in the trailer with him that he got up and 
left her, fully clothed, and walked alone toward the show 
grounds where he met a coworker who went with him to 
another bar; that he later returned to the show and woke up 
the next morning on a merry-go-round without knowing how 
he got there. 
The evidence directly linking defendant with the crime is 
almost nonexistent: He was identified as the man who was 
last seen walking to the trailers with the victim. There was 
no evidence on his clothing except two tears on his pants' 
pockets, which were proved to have occurred at an earlier 
time; and two unidentifiable minute blood spots on the back 
of one pants' leg. There were no blood stains on his shoes, 
no scrapings from under his nails connecting him with the 
victim; the only prints from his shoes were in the spot where 
he had been last seen with the woman when she was alive. 
There was nothing on defendant's clothing suggesting he had 
either raped, or killed, the woman. Circumstantial evidence 
and each link in the chain of circumstantial evidence must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime with which he was charged, and, furthermore, each 
link of that chain of circumstantial evidence must be ir-
reconcilable with any other rational conclusion (People v. 
Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144 [146 P.2d 469]; People v. Rayol, 
65 Cal.App.2d 462 [150 P.2d 812] ; People v. Koenig, 29 
Cal.2d 87 [173 P.2d 1]). 
:May 1957] PEOPLE v. :MooRE 
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In considering the applicable law, it should be noted that 
a woman's voice was heard, but that the one hearing the words 
did not consider that she was in distress; no man's voice was 
heard; no violent sounds were heard; no signs were found on 
defendant's clothing or hands which would even suggest he 
had committed the crime. The only evidence linking defend-
ant with the victim is that they had set out together with the 
avowed purpose of engaging, voluntarily, in sexual inter-
course; that they had been engaged in drinking, and making 
love, publicly for some time; that they were seen walking 
together toward the trailers. There was ample evidence in 
the record that other men and women slept in the trailers, 
and outside of them. 
With respect to the evidence as to defendant's conduct on 
the afternoon of the day of the crime, its only purpose could 
have been to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury. 
The general rule is that such evidence is inadmissible. There 
is an exception to the rule that such evidence is admissible 
when it is relevant to the issues in the case (People v. Evans, 
113 Cal.App.2d 124, 126 [247 P.2d 915]). The primary theory 
on which this case was tried was that defendant killed his 
victim in the attempt to commit rape, or in the actual com-
mission of rape. 'l'he evidence complained of concerned the 
woman with whom defendant had left the bar earlier in the 
day. After she and the defendant arrived at her home, where 
he had expected to have intercourse with her, she refused to 
let him in the house. He then refused to pay the cab driver 
and was taken back into town by the police. From this the 
majority infers that defendant was aroused to the point of rape 
by force and violence due to the frustration of his sexual 
desires. Even though I am of the opinion that the evidence 
was inadmissible for any purpose since it showed only defend-
ant's desire for sexual intercourse and had nothing whatsoever 
to do with either rape, or murder, since both women were 
apparently quite willing to go with defendant, its prejudicial 
effect upon the jury cannot be discounted. With the first 
woman's refusal to comply with defendant's wishes, he merely 
left her and refused to pay the taxi fare. There is nothing in 
this evidence which has any bearing on the issues of intent to 
commit rape with force and violence, or intent to kill, or a 
killing committed in the attempt to perpetrate, or the com-
mission of rape. In other words, to support murder of the 
first degree under the theory that it was committed in the 
attempt to commit, or the commission of, rape, the evidence 
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must show Pither lack of eonsent, or the use of force and vio-
lence in the commission of the act. ~When the conduct of the 
parties here is eonsidered, it is apparent that there was no 
laek of eonsent on the part of the vietim beeause she was with 
the defendant for the purpose of having intereourse with 
him. 'fhis is also true of the other woman who, apparently, 
later ehanged her mind. There was, however, no intimation 
that her ehange of mind caused any violence, or threat of vio-
lenee, on defendant's part. Inasmuch as he was charged with 
murder of the first degree on the theory that he committed 
said killing in the attempt to commit rape, or the commission 
thereof, it is difficult for me to see how the evidence could have 
been considered admissible on any theory. It is clear, how-
ever, that the effect of it was to prove to the jury that the 
defendant was a "bad" and "immoral" man capable of any 
crime and since he was the last one to be seen with her, even 
though she was with him voluntarily and willingly, and even 
though there was no further evidence linking him with the 
killing that he must have been the guilty one. 
I would reverse the judgment because I do not believe the 
evidence is suffieient and because I believe that the admission 
of the evidence of defendant's conduct earlier that afternoon 
was prejudicially erroneous. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The evidence is obviously suffi-
eient to establish a criminal homicide. It is also suggestive that 
defendant is the guilty perpetrator. But it convincingly 
negates, rather than proves, murder in an attempt to commit 
rape. It is not suffieient to establish premeditated murder. In 
the state of the record, and in the light of the errors pointed 
out by Mr. Justice Carter, the eonviction, in my view, should 
be reduced to murder of the second degree. Failing such ac-
tion, the judgment should be reversed. Imposition of the 
death penalty in a case such as this is manifestly a miscar-
riage of justiee and an abuse of the penalty. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 
1957. Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
